

Lecture 9


— Selection Problem

Exponential Mechanism.

Watch out HW2.

Released today or tomorrow.

Previously on Differential Privacy.



Selection Problem

Heavy Hitter

Example. A set of websites $\{1, \dots, d\}$

Each user submits $\mathcal{X}_i \subseteq \{1, \dots, d\}$ ← Visit a subset of websites

Winner: website with the highest score: $\forall j \in \{1, \dots, d\}$

$$f(j; \mathcal{X}) = |\{i \mid j \in \mathcal{X}_i\}|$$

The set of users who visited website j in the data set \mathcal{X} .

Notation

$|S|$ ← Cardinality or how many elements are in S .
↑
Set

Want to find website \hat{j} such that

$$\text{Error} = \max_{j^*} f(j^*; \mathcal{X}) - f(\hat{j}; \mathcal{X})$$

is small.



One Proposal:

→ Run Laplace Mechanism

to release $f(j; \mathcal{X})$ for all $j \in \{1, \dots, d\}$

→ then output \hat{j} with the maximum noisy score.



$G_S f = d$.
⇒ Adding Laplace noise scaling w/ d .

Example 2: Pricing a digital good.

- Selling an app; what price?
- n people's valuations: "How much are they willing to pay?"

Revenue: $f(p; x) = p \cdot \#\{i = x_i \geq p\}$.

x_i := private value.

Error: $\underbrace{\max_p f(p; x)}_{\text{optimal Revenue.}} - \underbrace{f(A(x), x)}_{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{Price returned by} \\ \text{your algorithm A.}}}$

4 people: $x_1 = 1$
 $x_2 = 1$
 $x_3 = 1$
 $x_4 = 4.01 \leftarrow \text{optimal price.}$

Formulation = Selection Problem

Y : possible outcomes (e.g. websites, prices).

$f: \underline{Y} \times \underline{X}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ "score" function (e.g., #hits, revenue)
measures how good y is on dataset x .

f is Δ -sensitive if $\forall y \in Y$
 $f(y; \cdot)$ has $GS_f \leq \Delta$.

Exponential Mechanism. $A_{EM}(x, f, \epsilon, \Delta)$

Output an outcome y with probability proportional to
 $\exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y; x)\right)$.

For this class, assume outcome space Y is finite.

$$\mathbb{P}[A_{EM}(x, f, \epsilon, \Delta) = y] = \frac{1}{C_x} \cdot \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y; x)\right)$$

"Normalization factor" $C_x = \sum_{y' \in Y} \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y'; x)\right)$.

Privacy Proof.

Theorem. For every Δ -sensitive f ,
 $A_{EM}(\cdot, f, \epsilon, \Delta)$ is ϵ -DP.

Proof. Fix any neighbors x & x' , any outcome $y \in Y$.

Goal: to show $P[A(x)=y] \leq e^\epsilon P[A(x')=y]$

plug in \leftarrow

$$\frac{P[A(x)=y]}{P[A(x')=y]} = \frac{\frac{1}{C_x} \cdot \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y;x)\right)}{\frac{1}{C_{x'}} \cdot \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y;x')\right)}$$

$\leq e^\epsilon P[A(x')=y]$

plug in \uparrow

$$= \underbrace{\frac{C_{x'}}{C_x}}_{\leq \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2}\right)?} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{\exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y;x)\right)}{\exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y;x')\right)}}_{\exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} (f(y;x) - f(y;x'))\right) \leq \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2}\right)} \leq \exp(\epsilon)$$

\swarrow

$$C_{x'} = \sum_{y' \in Y} \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y'; x')\right)$$

$$\leq \sum_{y' \in Y} \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2}\right) \cdot \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y'; x)\right)$$

$$= \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2}\right) \cdot C_x$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{C_{x'}}{C_x} \leq \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2}\right).$$

\searrow

For any y'

$$\exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y'; x)\right) \leq \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2}\right) \cdot \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y'; x')\right)$$

because

$$\frac{\exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y'; x)\right)}{\exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2\Delta} f(y'; x')\right)} \leq \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon}{2}\right)$$


Exp. Mechanism is everywhere.

Laplace Mechanism. $Y \in \mathbb{R}$

$$f: X^n \mapsto \mathbb{R}, \quad q(y; x) = - \underbrace{|y - f(x)|}_{\text{error}}$$

Laplace mechanism sample y w.p.

proportional to $\exp\left(\frac{-\epsilon}{2GS_f} |y - f(x)|\right)$



Randomized Response $Y = \{0, 1\}^n$

$$q(y; x) = \exp\left(-\frac{\epsilon}{2} \|y - x\|_1\right)$$

↑
private bits

RR samples y with prob proportional to

$$\exp\left(-\frac{\epsilon}{2} \|y - x\|_1\right).$$

Recitation on Friday (in-person)
w/ Justin.

How useful is EM?

Theorem. (Y is finite) Let $Y = [d]$

Then.
$$\mathbb{E}_{Y \sim A_{EM}} \left[\ell_{\max}(x) - \ell(Y; x) \right] \leq \frac{2\Delta}{\epsilon} (\ln(d) + 1)$$

"Tail Bound"
 $\forall t > 0,$
$$\mathbb{P}_{Y \sim A_{EM}} \left[\ell_{\max}(x) - \ell(Y; x) \geq \frac{2\Delta}{\epsilon} (\ln(d) + t) \right] < e^{-t}$$

Proof.